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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : CaseNo.20010887-CA 
JEFFREY RAY TOMPKINS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from concurrent sentences for two convictions of operating a 
clandestine drug laboratory, first and second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(l) and -5(1) (1998) (attached in Addendum A).1 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-
3(2)(e) & (j) (Supp. 2001). 
'Section 58-37d-5(l) was amended subsequent to commission of the offense in this 
case. However, the amendment is not relevant to these proceedings. For the reader's 
convenience, the State cites to the 1998 version of both statutes. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole question presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing defendant to concurrent statutory prison terms for operating two 
clandestine methamphetamine labs. 
'This [CJourt 'does not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds that prescribed by law 
or unless the trial court has abused its discretion.'" State v. Baker. 963 P.2d 801, 810 
(Utah App.) (quoting State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990)) (additional citation 
omitted), cert, denied. 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). A sentence will be overturned "only 
when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." State v. Woodland. 945 P.2d 665, 671 
(Utah 1997); State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (finding abuse of 
discretion when court fails to consider all legally relevant factors or when sentence 
imposed is clearly excessive); State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) 
(concluding that "appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court"); see also State v. 
Pierson. 2000 UT App 274, f 10, 12 P.3d 103, cert, denied. 20 P.3d 403 (Utah 2001); 
State v. Houk. 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are particularly relevant to 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with drug-related offenses in two separate informations. 
The first involved offenses occurring on September 23, 1999, and charged him with two 
counts of operating a clandestine lab, first and second degree felonies (RSC. 2-4).2 The 
second involved violations occurring on February 1, 2001, at a separate address, and 
charged him with possession of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment and 
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, both first degree felonies, and possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (RCA. 2-5). The cases were processed 
together. The parties reached a plea bargain under which defendant pled guilty to two 
counts of operating a clandestine drug laboratory, first and second degree felonies (RSC. 
28-29, 44,46; RCA. 27-28, 34, 36, 38). The State obtained dismissal of the remaining 
charges in both informations and recommended that the sentences be served concurrently 
(RSC. 30; R. 56: 3, 9). 
2The appellate record contains two pleadings files, one from each of the cases from 
which this appeal stems. For the reader's convenience, the State will duplicate 
defendant's citation form, citing to the folder numbered 20010887-SC as RSC. #, and 
folder number 20010887-CA as RCA. #. 
Folder number 20010887-CA contains a signed, written order (RCA. 40-41). 
Although no signed order appears in folder number 20010887-SC, a copy of a signed 
order for that file appears in folder number 20010887-CA (RSC. 36-37). 
The index appearing in folder number 20010887-CA is a copy of the index 
belonging to the other folder. No index of folder number 20010887-CA appears in that 
folder. 
3 
The court ordered a presentence investigation report ["PSI"] (R. 56: 9-10). At the 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel reported no inaccuracies in the report (R. 57: 3). The 
report contained a recommendation of a jail term, probation, and drug treatment (PSI. 76). 
The prosecutor dismissed the recommendation as the result of a policy decision relating to 
budgetary constraints, arguing that it was not specifically related to this defendant (R. 57: 
5-6). Instead, the prosecutor recommended concurrent prison terms for the two 
convictions, citing the amount of methamphetamine defendant had helped to produce and 
the length of his involvement (R. 57: 6-8) 
The sentencing judge noted his surprise at the recommendation in the PSI, stating 
that as he read the report, his inclination was to impose prison time (R. 57: 10). The 
judge made it clear his concern was about society as well as defendant (R. 57: 10-11). 
Based on the evidence before him, the judge sentenced defendant to a statutory prison 
term of five-years-to-life for the first degree felony (RSC. 46-47), and one-to-fifteen years 
for the second degree felony, to run concurrently (RCA. 36-37, 40-41). 
Defendant appealed the sentence in each case (RSC. 48-49, 60; RCA. 43-44, 55-
55A). By order dated December 19, 2001, the Utah Supreme Court poured over to this 
Court the appeal involving the first degree felony. This Court consolidated both appeals 
by order dated January 16, 2002. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Case No. 001920749: 
On September 23, 1999, police served a search warrant on the home of co-
defendant Martha Rojo in Salt Lake County, looking for evidence of a clandestine 
methamphetamine laboratory (RSC. 3; PSI 64). They found defendant in the basement 
(id.). He said he lived there (RSC. 3-4; PSI 64). A search of the home uncovered "a 
large clandestine laboratory" together with containers of suspected methamphetamine and 
other items of paraphernalia located in a separate area of the home (RSC. 3; PSI 64). 
Defendant admitted he was paid "substantial sums of money" to permit another person to 
manufacture methamphetamine in the home (RSC. 4; R. 57: 6). For six months, 
defendant received $500.00 plus an eight ball per "throw" (R. 57: 6).4 
Case No. 011903328: 
On February 1, 2001, police served a search warrant on a home in West Valley 
City, looking for a fugitive and evidence of a clandestine laboratory (RCA. 4; PSI 65). 
They found defendant in the basement with ph strips in his hands (id.). A search of the 
3The facts are taken from the informations and probable cause statements in both 
cases as well as from the official version of each offense as reported in the presentence 
investigation report. 
4
 An "eight ball" is an eighth of an ounce of methamphetamine (R. 57: 6). There 
are 35 grams in an ounce of methamphetamine, and the average dose is a quarter of a 
gram (id.). A "throw" appears to be the equivalent of a single batch of finished product 
and amounts to six-to-eight ounces each (R. 57: 6-7). Hence, one throw could produce 
from 840 to 1120 individual doses of methamphetamine (id.). Each eight ball defendant 
received would be the equivalent of approximately 17.5 individual doses. 
5 
home revealed a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory in the basement, completed 
methamphetamine (including nearly fifteen grams in nine different baggies), and 
miscellaneous paraphernalia (RCA. 4; PSI 65; R. 57: 7). Defendant—one of three people 
who lived at the home—admitted that he was making methamphetamine just prior to the 
officers' arrival and that he had been selling the finished drug to various people who 
came to the home for that purpose (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in sentencing him 
to prison in lieu of jail, probation, and drug treatment. He claims that the judge 
considered only the protection of society in pronouncing sentence and failed to consider a 
myriad of other factors which established defendant's desire for and ability to succeed at 
rehabilitation. However, the record establishes that, in addition to considering the issue 
of societal protection, the sentencing judge considered the entirety of the information 
before him relevant to sentencing and gave full credence to defendant's sincerity in his 
desire for rehabilitation and future self-improvement. The judge ultimately determined 
that the favorable sentencing factors were outweighed by the need to protect society in 
light of defendant's repeated and escalating involvement with thegravely serious 
business of methamphetamine production, sale, and use. That determination is not an 




THE RECORD FULLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO 
STATUTORILY-AUTHORIZED PRISON TERMS FOR HIS TWO 
CONVICTIONS FOR MANUFACTURING METHAMPHETAMINE 
Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of prison terms for each of the 
crimes to which he pled guilty. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
relying solely on the seriousness of the crimes to support the prison sentences. Br. of 
Aplt. at 11-14. He claims that the trial court failed to consider significant evidence 
relating to his "favorable prospects for probation and rehabilitation." Id. at 12-16. 
However, the record reflects no abuse of discretion where the sentencing judge 
considered both societal interests and defendant's rehabilitation prospects. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling: 
Following argument by the parties concerning an appropriate sentence, the trial 
judge presented his ruling and reasoning: 
When I read through this Presentence Report, I wrote down what - in the 
margin what I was thinking would be appropriate. And when I read the 
recommendations, I was quite surprised, as well. And, frankly, my thoughts were 
more in keeping with what I've heard the State recommend in this case. 
Mr. Tompkins, I have no doubt that you are sincere, that you believe in 
everything that you are telling me but this case is not about you, totally. And what 
is a concern to me and to our community, our whole state, is the number of 
clandestine laboratories, the number of meth labs, the number of productions of 
those, the sheer volume that take place [sic] in meth labs and the untold, 
unaccountable damage that they do in our community. So, while we are also 
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concerned (Inaudible), if not totally that and the damage and the harm that's been 
done through this lab (Inaudible) others. 
So, after having reviewed the fact that we have operation of a lab in 2001 
and another operation in September of 1999, Second and First Degree Felonies, 
respectively, I'm going to go with the recommendation, that conclusion that I first 
came with, as well as what the State's recommending. 
If this were just you, it would be wonderful, but it is not. 
So I'm going to sentence you to five years to life on the First Degree 
Felony and one to fifteen on the Second Degree Felony. 
Those can be served concurrently, and you will start serving it today. 
What that means is that at some point you'll be considered for parole. And 
there's nothing that will prevent you from getting your treatment and the help that 
you want and that you are seeking, the chance that you want. And I hope that you 
succeed, and I hope we don't see you back here. I wish that for you. I want you 
to succeed. 
And if this - 1 have said before in this courtroom that I don't believe that 
there are victimless crimes, and there's certainly nobody arguing that in this case. 
And it couldn't be demonstrated if anybody tried. And so — at some point you are 
going to be released, and at some point you need to get back to your life. And I 
hope that you do. Your family hopes that you do. And you can say what you want 
about whether this was fair or whether it's right. I happen to think it is, balancing 
all aspects of this case as I understand them. And there'll come a day when you 
are back with your family, and I hope that's successful. I hope you (Inaudible). 
(R. 57: 10-12) (attached in Addendum B). 
B. The Standard of Appellate Review: 
'This [Cjourt 'does not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds that prescribed by law 
or unless the trial court has abused its discretion.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 
(Utah App.) (quoting State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990)) (additional citation 
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omitted), cert, denied. 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). "Sentencing requires such discretion 
because it 'necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court.'" State v. Woodland, 
945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 'Thus, a sentence imposed by the trial 
court should be overturned only when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Id.; 
State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (finding abuse of discretion when 
court fails to consider all legally relevant factors or when sentence imposed is clearly 
excessive). An "appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Gerrard. 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). See also State v. Pierson. 2000 UT App 274, f 10, 12 P.3d 
103, cert, denied, 20 P.3d 403 (Utah 2001); State v. Houk. 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 
1995). 
Moreover, a "[djefendant has no right to be placed on probation, that being within 
the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908, 909 (Utah 1992). Thus, 
where nothing in the record suggests "that the court considered any unreliable 
information in pronouncing sentence" or that "any other impropriety" occurred, the trial 
court does not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to "the sentence prescribed by 
statute." Id. 
Finally, the State is not prohibited from incarcerating a defendant "'for purposes 
other than rehabilitation.'" State v. NuttalL 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting 
State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261, 268 (Utah 1986)). Another appropriate purpose may be 
9 
"to protect society from an individual deemed to be a danger to the community." NuttaU, 
861 P.2d at 458; see also Bishop, 717 P.2d at 265. Additional purposes include 
deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation. See State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 
1048, 1051 (UtahApp. 1991). 
C The Record Supports the Sentencing Judge's Imposition of the Statutorily-
Prescribed Sentences 
Defendant claims that the trial judge based its ruling solely on society's concern 
for stopping drugs, and that he gave no individual consideration whatsoever to the other 
factors he claims pertained to this particular defendant that and weigh in favor of 
probation and drug treatment: his minimal criminal history, his familial support, his 
sincere desire for rehabilitation, the "extremely low risk of re-offending" he presents, his 
acceptance into a drug treatment program, his good character and desire for reform, his 
willingness to accept therapy for his drug problem, his steady employment in the past, his 
educational and future employment desires, his expressed remorse, his new-found 
understanding of the seriousness of his actions, and the PSI recommendation of a year in 
jail followed by drug treatment. Br. of Aplt. at 12-16. In other words, defendant 
believes that under the circumstances at hand, the trial court would necessarily abuse its 
discretion by sentencing him to serve any prison time, even though the statute expressly 
provides for a lengthy prison sentence for these crimes. However, the record amply 
supports the trial court's sentencing decision. 
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Defendant recognizes only two aspects of the case that support the trial court's 
sentencing decision: the seriousness of the crimes and his "apparent retraction about 
selling and trading drugs." Id. at 13-14. He claims that these points do not mandate a 
prison sentence, and that other factors required rejection of the statutorily-permitted 
punishment. Id. at 14-15. His narrow view of the situation ignores a number of facts 
which support the sentencing decision, not the least of which is that the sentences 
imposed in this case were the proper statutory penalties prescribed for his offenses. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (Supp. 2001). Defendant received no more punishment 
than that provided for by law. He also received the punishment which the State agreed to 
recommend pursuant to the plea bargain (RSC. 30). 
Another fact obvious to the sentencing judge was defendant's status as a serial 
offender. He committed the same serious crime not once, but twice, both times in 
locations that subjected him to the statutory enhancement provisions, thereby making his 
conduct even more dangerous than necessary to an unsuspecting public (RSC. 4). His 
involvement with the first lab lasted for six months and apparently halted only because he 
got caught (R. 57: 6-7). That did not prevent him, however, from thereafter repeating his 
criminal conduct 
Moreover, even if one believes defendant, his involvement escalated from merely 
cleaning up after and profiting from the manufacturing enterprise to attempting to 
manufacture it himself and selling it from his home (RSC. 4; RCA. 4; R. 57: 6-7; PSI. 65-
11 
66)/ If one looks at all the evidence, however, part of the payment defendant received 
for permitting others to run the lab in his home the first time was more methamphetamine 
than a person would need for individual use (R. 57: 6-7). Even after being caught the first 
time, defendant went on to get further involved in the same kind of dangerous enterprise 
at a new location, resorting to stealing the necessary ingredients to manufacture the 
methamphetamine himself in a clandestine laboratory in his basement (RSC. 2-4; RCA. 2-
5; PSI. 65-66). 
The record shows that defendant continued with his criminal conduct despite 
numerous opportunities to stop. Neither his family nor his three prior stints in jail for 
minor traffic violations and marijuana possession had any impact on his habit or his 
criminal activity. His first arrest did not deter his later involvement in a second 
clandestine laboratory. Instead, despite being faced with several drug charges which 
could have garnered him several years in prison upon conviction, he got himself even 
more involved in a second laboratory without even waiting for the criminal proceedings 
on the first laboratory to be completed. Finally, he made no attempt to get help for his 
drug problem until he was put in jail for a prolonged period of time following discovery 
of the second laboratory, with the outcome of both criminal proceedings still uncertain 
(RCA. 24; R. 57: 4-5; PSI. 70, 72). 
'Defendant admitted to the arresting officer that he sold the drugs out of his home 
(RCA. 4; PSI. 65). By the time the PSI was complete, defendant retracted that statement 
and claimed he never sold any of it (PSI. 66). 
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All this information was before the sentencing judge as he considered his 
sentencing options. In addition, the prosecutor emphasized the amazing quantity of drugs 
involved in the first lab alone: not only the conservative estimate of 840 hits of 
methamphetamine in any given "throw" produced at the lab over the six months of 
defendant's involvement, but the seventeen individual doses paid to defendant for each 
"throw" throughout the six months. By the time he was caught in the act of making drugs 
at the second lab, defendant had resorted to stealing ingredients to make his own 
methamphetamine, purportedly for his own use. However, at 840 hits per "throw," the 
sentencing judge could reasonably have rejected defendant's claim that he was making it 
only for himself. 
On this record, it is clear that the sentencing decision encompassed more than 
simply consideration of societal interests, although societal protection weighed heavily in 
the judge's decision. The sentencing judge explained that he had considered and 
balanced "all aspects of this case" and had thoroughly read the presentence report, 
making notes in the margin as he went (R. 57: 10-12). He also explained that he had "no 
doubt" about defendant's sincerity in his expressed desire for rehabilitation and 
betterment of himself in the future (R. 57: 10). The judge noted, "If this were just you, it 
would be wonderful, but it is not" (R. 57: 11). This was a tacit acknowledgment of the 
favorable information on which defendant's brief focuses, together with the judge's belief 
that the information would have carried more weight in defendant's favor if he had not 
13 
chosen to embark on a repeated criminal enterprise which necessarily involved the lives 
of many other individuals. Hence, the judge noted and recognized the sentencing factors 
favoring defendant, but found them to be less weighty than other factors in determining 
the appropriate sentence for this defendant in light of the crimes to which he pled guilty. 
The judge felt that defendant's repeated involvement in clandestine methamphetamine 
laboratories over a relatively short period made him a dangerous person from whom 
society should be protected and that societal protection outweighed individual 
rehabilitation in this case. See Nuttall 861 P.2d at 458 (defendants may be incarcerated 
for purposes other than rehabilitation, including "to protect society from an individual 
deemed to be a danger to the community")- Under the facts before him, the sentencing 
judge was justified in determining that probation would not be in the public interest given 
the escalation in defendant's involvement in methamphetamine production, sale, and use. 
See Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1051 (a sentencing judge must consider whether probation "will 
best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
14 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
This case does not present a novel or important issue. Consequently, the State 
does not ask that the matter be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of May, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
C''<--7 ( v . <, i /< t^^Sf 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Titles 58 and 58A 
58-37d-4. f ron iDi iea acm — orauuu ucgi w »«; *«*..^ . 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
Hiatory? C. 1962, 6eV27d-4, mmmcUd by L. (1M f) and (g) and made »tylistic changes accord 
199*, eh. 166, I 4; 1997, ck. 64, I 11. ingly 
Aa»eada»e*t Noiaa. — The 1997 amend- Cro— Reference*. — Sentencing for felo-
ment, effective May 5,1997. added Subaectiona niea, ftft 76 3 201, 76-3 203, 76 3 301 
58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person wbo violates Subsection 58 37d 4( 1 Ka), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or 
manufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved a person less 
than 18 years of age; 
(f) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(g) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
Subsections (IKa) through (g) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
History: C. 1963, 68-37d-6, enacted by L. 
1992, cb. 166, ft 6; 1997, cb. 64. ft 12. 
ADDENDUM B 
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Carlton Way, Registared Professional Reporter 
I is going to change Mr. Tompkins, not just his freedom, but 
2 j change — change the things about him that got him involved in 
3 j this in the first place. And that's attacking the addiction 
4 that he has. 
5 And, as he's indicated to you, he's taken steps in 
g those programs. And, as the report confirms and as we know, 
7 there — he is accepted at Odyssey House. We understand that 
3 there is additional time recommended. But this is not a 
9 person that needs to go to prison simply to protect the rest 
10 of us from him. He knows he was involved in something 
11 extremely bad and extremely dangerous and extremely harmful. 
12 But he's — he's — hefs changed from that, and he will 
13 change, and he will complete this program if you give him that 
14 opportunity, I'm certain, Judge. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. 
16 When I read through this Presentence Report, I wrote 
17 down what --in the margin what I was thinking would be 
18 appropriate. And when I read the recommendations, I was quite 
19 surprised, as well. And, frankly, my thoughts were more in 
20 keeping with what I've heard the State recommend in this case. 
21 I Mr. Tompkins, I have no doubt that you are sincere, 
22 that you believe in everything that you are telling me but 
23 this case is not about you, totally. And what is a concern to 
24 me and to our community, our whole state, is the number of 
25 clandestine laboratories, the number of meth labs, the number 
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of productions of those, the sheer volume that take place in 
meth labs and the untold, unaccountable damage that they do in 
our community. So, while we are also concerned (Inaudible), 
if not totally that and the damage and the harm that's been 
done through this lab (Inaudible) others. 
So, after having reviewed the fact that we have 
operation of a lab in 2001 and another operation in September 
of 1999, Second and First Degree Felonies, respectively, I'm 
going to go with the recommendation, that conclusion that I 
first came with, as well as what the State's recommending. 
If this were just you, it would be wonderful, but it 
is not. 
So I'm going to sentence you to five years to life on 
the First Degree Felony and one to fifteen on the Second 
Degree Felony. 
Those can be served concurrently, and you will start 
serving it today. 
What that means is that at some point you'll be 
considered for parole. And there's nothing that will prevent 
you from getting your treatment and the help that you want and 
that you are seeking, the chance that you want. And I hope 
that you succeed, and I hope we don't see you back here. I 
wish that for you. I want you to succeed. 
And if this — I have said before in this courtroom 
that I don't believe that there are victimless crimes, and 
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1 there's certainly nobody arguing that in this case. And it 
2 couldn't be demonstrated if anybody tried. And so — at some 
3 point you are going to be released; and at some point you need 
4 to get back to your life. And I hope that you do. Your 
5 family hopes that you do. And you can say what you want about 
6 whether this was fair or whether it's right. I happen to 
7 think it is, balancing all aspects of this case as I 
8 understand them. And there'll come a day when you are back 
9 with your family, and I hope that's successful. I hope you 
10 (Inaudible) 
11 I MR. MACK: Judge, that's credit for time served of 
12 240 days, additionally? 
13 THE COURT: That's fine with me. I will take that 
14 into account. 
15 MR. MACK: (Inaudible) 










Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
12 
